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RYAN V. GONZALES AND THE POTENTIAL ELIMINATION OF 
THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL POST 
CONVICTION FAILSAFE 
Ryan v. Gonzalez, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013) 
Kathleen Carlson∗ 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed in Ryan v. 
Gonzales “whether the incompetence of a state prisoner requires 
suspension of the prisoner’s federal habeas corpus proceedings.”1 In a 
unanimous decision, the Court held that “the Courts of Appeals for the 
Ninth and Sixth Circuits both erred in holding that district courts must stay 
federal habeas proceedings when petitioners are adjudged incompetent.”2 
The decision leaves unanswered questions with regard to a petitioner’s 
ability to protect himself from ineffective or incompetent counsel both 
before and during the habeas proceeding. 
While it is clear that the decision in Ryan foreclosed the possibility that 
either 18 U.S.C. §§ 3599 or 4241 grant the right to competency, there are 
some policy considerations that the Court did not address. Adding further 
confusion to this issue the Supreme Court stated:  
If a district court concludes that the petitioner’s claim could 
substantially benefit from the petitioner's assistance, the 
district court should take into account the likelihood that the 
petitioner will regain competence in the foreseeable future. 
Where there is no reasonable hope of competence, a stay is 
inappropriate and merely frustrates the State’s attempts to 
defend its presumptively valid judgment.3  
This language indicates that the Court recognizes that some cases—
presumably those involving ineffective assistance of counsel claims—
would benefit from the petitioner’s participation. However, the decision 
discourages courts from granting stays to those petitioners who stand no 
reasonable hope of regaining competency.4 Further, the decision did not 
address what failsafe is in place to protect a petitioner from incompetent 
habeas counsel. After summarizing Ryan and its procedural history, this 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would like to thank 
Professor Lea Johnston for introducing me to this topic and inspiring my interest in mental health 
law. Special thanks to Elizabeth Bowers and all of the brilliant editors of the Florida Law Review 
for their support and guidance. 
 1. Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 700 (2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 709. 
 4. Id. 
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Comment considers the policy ramifications of Ryan as it relates to 
ineffective assistance of counsel at both the state and federal court levels. 
Ryan considered two circuit court decisions, the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Carter v. Bradshaw5 and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re 
Gonzales.6 Both cases and their procedural histories will be considered 
separately. In Carter, respondent Sean Carter was charged with aggravated 
murder, aggravated robbery, and rape in an Ohio state court, and, after 
considering the evidence presented during trial, a jury convicted Carter on 
all counts and sentenced him to death.7 After exhausting his appeal rights 
under state law, Carter filed a writ of habeas corpus.8 While his proceeding 
was pending, and after he filed his third amended petition, Carter filed a 
motion for a competency hearing.9 The district court granted Carter’s 
motion for a competency hearing, and, after an exhaustive hearing, the 
district judge deemed Carter incompetent to assist counsel; dismissed 
Carter’s case without prejudice; and prospectively tolled the statute of 
limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA).10  
The State of Ohio appealed the district court’s decision.11 After 
considering the record, the Sixth Circuit ordered Carter’s habeas petition to 
be stayed until he was competent to assist counsel.12 The court relied on 
Rees v. Peyton,13 a Supreme Court decision, which it interpreted to stand 
for the proposition that habeas petitioners have a statutory right to 
competency in certain situations through 18 U.S.C. § 4241.14 In Rees, the 
Court considered whether a petitioner who had been declared incompetent 
by a psychiatrist could withdraw his habeas petition for certiorari.15 
Through application of § 4241 to habeas proceedings, the Rees Court 
determined that in order to proceed, a defendant must be competent enough 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Carter v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 329 (2011).  
 6. In re Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242 (2010). 
 7. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 701. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 702. 
 13. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 313–14 (1966). 
 14. Carter v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 329, 332 (2011) (quoting Rees, 384 U.S. at 313–14) (“[I]n 
order to ‘aid . . . the proper exercise of th[e] Court’s certiorari jurisdiction’ . . . the Court directed 
the district court to apply 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244–4245, which has been recodified as 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4241.”). Section 4241 allows a defendant to file a motion for a competency determination. If, after 
the hearing, the court determines that a defendant is suffering from a mental disease rendering him 
incompetent “to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the 
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense” the defendant is to be committed to the 
custody of the Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (a)–(d) (2006). 
 15. Rees, 384 U.S. at 313. 
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to understand the action against him and to properly assist in his defense.16 
The Court concluded that the petition should be stayed until the petitioner 
regained competence.17 In rendering its decision to grant the stay, the Sixth 
Circuit relied on the provision of § 4241 which states that a competency 
hearing may be held “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the 
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect 
rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to 
understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or 
to assist properly in his defense.”18 
In In re Gonzales, respondent Ernest Valencia Gonzales was convicted 
in Arizona for felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, first-
degree burglary, and theft, and sentenced to death.19 Following the 
exhaustion of his state appeals, Gonzales filed a petition for habeas relief 
in federal court.20 While his habeas petition was pending, Gonzales’s 
appointed counsel moved the district court to stay his habeas proceeding on 
the basis that Gonzales was not competent to proceed.21 The district court 
denied the stay in light of Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford,22 a Ninth 
Circuit decision that interpreted the right to counsel in the federal post-
conviction relief guarantee of 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) to imply a right to 
competence.23 The district court reasoned that because claims in a habeas 
proceeding are based on the record, Gonzales’s counsel would not benefit 
from his input in the case; therefore, there was no reason to stay the 
proceedings until he was found competent to assist counsel.24 The court did 
not rule on respondent’s competency but did find that he had a “limited 
capacity for rational communication.”25 
Gonzales filed a writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.26 While the petition was pending, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Nash 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 702 (quoting Carter, 644 F.3d at 333).  
 17. Id. at 702. 
 18. Carter, 644 F.3d at 333. 
 19. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 700. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (2003). 
 23. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 701. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) reads in relevant part: 
In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of title 28, United 
States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any defendant who is 
or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investigative, 
expert, or other reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment 
of one or more attorneys. 
18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2006).  
 24. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 701. 
 25. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Schriro, 617 F. Supp. 2d 849, 863 (2008)). 
 26. Id. at 701. 
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v. Ryan27 that 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) provides a right to competency 
during an appeal.28 In granting Gonzales’s writ of mandamus and finding a 
right to competency for a habeas petitioner, the Ninth Circuit applied 18 
U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) since appeals, like habeas proceedings, are entirely 
based on the record.29  
Ohio and Arizona both appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
which granted certiorari to determine if either § 3599 or § 4241 provided a 
defendant with a statutory right to competency in a federal habeas 
proceeding.30 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that neither 
statute requires a petitioner to be competent during a habeas proceeding.31 
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s writ of mandamus and 
vacated the Sixth Circuit’s opinion.32  
As the Ninth and Sixth Circuits relied upon different statutes as 
authority to support a defendant’s right to competency during a habeas 
proceeding, each opinion will be considered separately. Turning first to the 
Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Carter v. Bradshaw, the Sixth Circuit found that 
§ 4241 provides habeas petitioners with a right to competency during their 
habeas proceeding.33 In vacating the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, the Supreme 
Court concluded that § 4241 does provide a statutory right to competency, 
but not for a petitioner in a habeas proceeding.34 The Court pointed out that 
§ 4241 applies only to trial and pre-sentencing proceedings and is thus not 
applicable to habeas proceedings that occur after sentencing.35 The Court 
also recognized that Title 18 only applies to federal defendants who are 
prosecuted by the United States.36 Both Gonzales and Carter were state 
prisoners who challenged their convictions with a federal civil action.37 
The Court then explored the language of § 4241, which authorizes a 
competency hearing before a defendant must face a proceeding against 
him.38 The Court stated that a habeas proceeding is not a proceeding 
against the petitioner, rather it is a civil action brought by the petitioner.39 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Nash v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048 (2009). 
 28. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 701. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 701–02. 
 31. Id. at 700. 
 32. Id. at 709–10. 
 33. Carter v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 329, 337 (2011). 
 34. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 706–07. 
 35. Id. (explaining that § 4241 by its own language only applies to presentence proceedings, 
and is therefore inapplicable to federal habeas petitions). See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2006) (“At any 
time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the 
defendant, or at any time after the commencement of probation or supervised release and prior to 
the completion of the sentence.”). 
 36. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 707. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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Therefore, it concluded that the statutory right to competence found in 
§ 4241 does not apply to habeas proceedings.40 
In reversing the Ninth Circuit in Gonzales, the Court looked to the 
language of § 3599, which the Ninth Circuit previously relied upon as a 
basis for finding a statutory right for a petitioner’s competency during a 
habeas proceeding.41 The Court determined that § 3599 does not apply to 
competency in a habeas hearing.42 The Court reasoned that the language in 
the statute only provides that indigent defendants are given adequate 
representation with experience in death penalty litigation.43 It noted that the 
statute does not provide a directive that district courts must stay 
proceedings where a petitioner is incompetent to assist counsel.44 Further, 
the right to assistance of counsel comes from the Sixth Amendment.45 The 
Court concluded that if the right to counsel implied a right to competency, 
the right to competency during trial would stem from the Sixth 
Amendment instead of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.46  
Since the Ninth Circuit relied on Rohan and Rees for its conclusion in 
Gonzales, the Supreme Court addressed both decisions in Ryan. While 
considering Rohan, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit mistakenly 
attributed a substantial constitutional concern to the petitioner’s due 
process claim.47 The Court found this attribution “puzzling” in light of the 
fact that the Ninth Circuit recognized that there was no constitutional right 
to counsel in a habeas proceeding.48 In considering Rees, the Court refuted 
the Ninth Circuit’s belief that Rees stood for the proposition that 
incompetence is grounds for staying a habeas proceeding.49 It explained 
that the issue in Rees centered on whether an incompetent petitioner could 
revoke his petition for habeas relief, not whether the proceeding could be 
stayed until a petitioner gains competence.50 As such, the Court found that 





                                                                                                                     
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 701, 705–06. 
 42. Id. at 702. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 703. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 704. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 705. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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Recognizing the backwards-looking nature of the habeas proceeding, 
the Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit that mental incompetency would 
“eviscerate” a petitioner’s right to counsel.52 As a habeas proceeding does 
not require evidence outside of the record, the Court asserted that an 
attorney generally can provide effective counsel regardless of the 
competency level of the petitioner.53 Attorneys do not rely on the client’s 
assistance to review the record, assemble arguments, or identify legal 
errors in the case.54 After finding that the Ninth Circuit’s statutory 
interpretation failed, and that there was no precedent to be relied upon to 
reach its conclusion, the Court reversed the decision.55 
The Court also considered the effects of indefinite stays and concluded 
that stays “frustrate[]” the finality of the sentencing by allowing a 
petitioner to suspend the resolution of the proceeding.56 Petitioners facing a 
death sentence are not incentivized to obtain federal relief as quickly as 
possible and may use tactics like these to extend incarceration and 
temporarily avoid execution.57 These tactics are unfair to the State who 
must, at some point, “be allowed to defend its judgment of conviction.”58 
The Court is clear that this decision does not lift the proscription of 
“carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”59  
Finally, the Court addressed the district courts’ discretion in staying 
proceedings for competency.60 The Court refused to “manage the[] 
dockets” of the district courts by defining precise contours of the issuance 
of stays, instead choosing to defer matters of competency stays to the 
discretion of the courts.61 The Court noted that district courts have the 
inherent authority to stay their proceedings, however it urged courts to 
disallow stays in cases where petitioners do not have a “reasonable” hope 
of competency in the future.62 In order to warrant review, the petitioner 
must show an abuse of discretion.63  
In Gonzales, the district court denied the motion for a stay after finding 
that Gonzales’s competence was not at issue since all of Gonzales’ claims 
were record based.64 Any evidence Gonzales could have presented in this 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Id. at 704. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 705. 
 55. Id. at 706. 
 56. Id. at 709. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 709 n.18 (citing Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934, (2007) 
(quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410–11 (1986))). 
 60. Id. at 708–09. 
 61. Id. at 708. 
 62. Id. at 709. 
 63. Id. at 707 n.13.  
 64. Id. at 708. 
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proceeding would have been inadmissible, as a habeas petition is a guard 
against miscarriages of justice and not for the correction of ordinary 
errors.65 Similarly, three of Carter’s four claims did not warrant a 
competency stay either, since those claims were also record-based and any 
additional evidence presented would have been inadmissible.66 The Court 
concluded that a district court, in granting a stay for incompetency, should 
consider the likelihood of a petitioner regaining competence if a 
petitioner’s claim would “substantially” benefit from the assistance of a 
competent petitioner.67 However, it found that a stay is not appropriate and 
would only serve to disrupt the state’s ability to defend its judgment if 
there is no “reasonable” hope of competence in the future.68 
This Comment does not argue that the Court’s decision in Ryan was 
incorrect. Rather, it suggests that there are situations that the Court did not 
address in its opinion that may lead to issues in the future. The Court’s 
decision only considers whether a statutory right to competency stays is 
found in § 4241 or § 3599. The Court’s thorough review of the statutes 
cited by both the Ninth and Sixth Circuit clearly shows that these statutes 
do not provide a habeas petitioner a statutory right to competency. 
Complications may arise from the Court’s directive that district courts have 
discretion to issue stays by considering the duration of time for a petitioner 
to regain competency as long as the petitioner’s assistance would 
“substantially benefit” his counsel.69 The Court considers competency stays 
inappropriate for petitioners who stand little chance of ever regaining 
competency.70 This standard raises several questions about a petitioner’s 
ability to protect himself from ineffective or incompetent representation 
both before and during a habeas proceeding.  
Neither AEDPA nor the Court’s decision in the instant case deprives a 
district court of the ability to stay a proceeding.71 A key concern of the 
Court was allowing the state to achieve finality in its judgment.72 However, 
the Court recognized the discretion of district courts to grant stays for 
incompetence and deferred to a district court’s judgment to determine 
when a petitioner’s participation will “substantially benefit” counsel.73 
However, “substantially” is a vague standard. Without defining this term, 
the door is left open for a variety of litigation over what constitutes 
“substantially benefit.” The need for interpretation of this ambiguous term 
may well lead the state further away from its judgment finality and down a 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 709. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 708. 
 72. Id. at 709. 
 73. Id. 
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long path of litigious clarification. 
Further complications may arise in light of the fact that the instant case 
deters district courts from issuing competency stays to petitioners who 
have little hope of regaining competency.74 A petitioner’s competency may 
play a role in his ability to undertake the necessary steps for an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.75 Courts favor a strong presumption for the 
effectiveness of counsel,76 thus a petitioner’s proof of incompetence must 
be compelling and complete. Indeed, this is a difficult threshold even for a 
fully competent defendant.77 
The opinion repeatedly explains the evidentiary inadmissibility of any 
additional facts that a competent petitioner may add to his or her case.78 
Since any additional information an attorney receives from the client would 
not be admissible during the habeas proceeding, the Court concludes that 
“counsel can read the record,” and there is therefore no need for the client 
to be competent to assist the attorney.79 Again, the Court does not consider 
other reasons why a client’s participation in the case may be imperative.80 
In some cases, it is difficult for petitioner’s counsel to carry out their duties 
to the client without competent participation from the client.81  
For example, counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence at 
sentencing is one common claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where 
the petitioner’s assistance may be important. Defense counsel’s 
presentation of mitigating evidence at sentencing, particularly in a capital 
case, is significant not only for sentencing but also for developing a 
                                                                                                                     
 74. Id.  
 75. In order to be successful with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must 
show that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 686 (1984). This has been expressed as a two-prong test. See Gregory J. O’Meara, “You Can’t 
Get There From Here?”: Ineffective Assistance Claims in Federal Circuit Courts After AEDPA, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 545, 569 (2009). The first prong requires a defendant to prove his counsel was 
deficient. Id. The second prong requires showing that the defense was prejudiced due to the 
deficiency. Id. 
 76. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 77. See Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at *23–24, Ryan v. 
Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013) (Nos. 10-930, 11-218), 2012 WL 3109425 [hereinafter ACLU 
Brief] (describing the difficultly petitioners face in preparing a post-conviction petition). 
 78. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 708–09. 
 79. Id. at 708. 
 80. A petitioner’s participation may be relevant in encouraging counsel to timely file a habeas 
petition, prompting counsel to raise all viable claims, moving for a substation of counsel if the 
current counsel is not adequate, developing facts for evidentiary hearings, “and participating in 
litigation of a variety of facts concerning the state-court proceedings that may well be significant, if 
not outcome determinative, in the litigation of the federal writ.” ACLU Brief, supra note 77, at *5.  
 81. Id. at *5–6 (“These [duties] include fact investigation, evaluation of the accuracy of the 
state court rulings and fact-findings, and determination and consideration of what may have 
transpired in the proceedings but may not have been captured in the record.”). 
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reliable appellate and post-conviction record.82 Indeed, it is of such 
significance that the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutionally 
protected right to present such evidence.83 At the habeas stage, a 
petitioner’s counsel must present evidence that the sentencing was 
prejudiced by the fact that the mitigating evidence was not shown.84 Where 
the record has not been fully developed, the petitioner’s assistance could be 
crucial.85 If an incompetent petitioner is unable to effectively communicate 
his mitigating factors with his habeas counsel, counsel will find great 
difficulty in fleshing out the factors for mitigation. 
In addition to incompetent counsel at the pre-conviction stage, the 
Court’s decision in the instant case does not address potential issues with 
attorney incompetence at the habeas stage. Instead, Ryan repeated the 
notion that attorneys are capable of handling the proceeding without the aid 
of a competent petitioner.86 The Court does not address situations where 
capable attorneys simply fail to adequately manage the petitioner’s case 
whether through negligence or inadvertence.87 Since a petitioner cannot 
seek habeas relief from ineffective or incompetent assistance of counsel 
from collateral federal post conviction proceeding, it is vital that the 
petitioner is competent to monitor and assist his counsel during his habeas 
proceeding.88  
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2261 does not foreclose the appointment of different 
counsel at the request of the petitioner during “any phase of State or 
Federal post-conviction proceedings on the basis of the ineffectiveness or 
incompetence of counsel in such proceedings.”89 This raises a difficult 
question. How is a petitioner who is incompetent to assist counsel expected 
to recognize that his habeas counsel is ineffective, and then make a 
sufficient request to the court for new counsel? The ACLU’s amicus brief 
for the respondent in Ryan identifies several instances where an attorney 
failed to take the proper action in a petitioner’s case, and but for the 
petitioner’s intervention, the petitioner’s opportunity for a habeas 
                                                                                                                     
 82. Dale E. Ho, Silent at Sentencing: Waiver Doctrine and a Capital Defendant’s Right to 
Present Mitigating Evidence After Schriro v. Landrigan, 62 FLA. L. REV. 721, 726, 742 (2010). 
 83. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 519 (2003) (holding that petitioner was entitled to 
habeas relief after his counsel failed to uncover or present evidence of mitigating circumstances at 
sentencing); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 (2000) (sustaining a petitioner’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim because of his counsel’s failure to present mitigating factors at 
sentencing amounted to a failure of reasonable representation). 
 84. See Ho, supra note 82, at 726–27. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 704, 708 (2013). 
 87. Kyle Graham, Tactical Ineffective Assistance in Capital Trials, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1645, 
1684 (2008) (providing examples of common errors made by post-conviction attorneys). 
 88. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2006) (“The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during 
Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a 
proceeding arising under section 2254.”). 
 89. Id. § 2261(e). 
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proceeding would have expired.90  
The Court’s observation that petitioners who await the death penalty 
have no incentive to expedite the habeas relief proceedings91 is confusing 
and not necessarily factual. This is particularly true in light of the limited 
amount of incompetency petitions.92 While there are certainly petitioners 
who lack incentive to reach finality in the judgment, the Court’s reasoning 
seems to dismiss the possibility that there are petitioners with a legitimate 
habeas claim. In circumstances where a petitioner was genuinely wronged 
by the judicial system and is awaiting an improper death sentence, that 
petitioner has every reason to expedite the habeas process. 
In conclusion, Ryan overlooks the fact that a death row petitioner can 
offer a unique and necessary perspective to his habeas petition. This 
Comment does not advocate for granting indefinite stays in every instance 
of petitioner incompetence. However, in considering the small number of 
incompetence stays granted in habeas proceedings, it appears that 
providing a stay for every incompetent habeas petitioner in a capital case 
would not be an extreme burden on the court system. In 2012, 
approximately 3,100 inmates were on death row awaiting execution.93 
From June 2003 through September 2010, only 701 capital habeas claims 
were brought to federal court,94 and petitioner incompetency was raised in 
only 34 of those cases.95 Appellate attorneys readily recognize the rarity of 
the success of habeas petitions.96 Only 1.5% of all capital habeas cases 
were stayed due to petitioner’s incompetence.97 The Court’s ruling in Ryan 
may have negative consequences on incompetent habeas petitioners who 
can benefit through facilitation of counsel. Limited discretionary stays for 
                                                                                                                     
 90. See ACLU Brief, supra note 77, at *7–13. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, at 2562–
63 (2010) is one example cited by the ACLU Brief. In Holland, Florida death row inmate Albert 
Holland requested his counsel submit a state post conviction petition. ACLU Brief at *8. Holland 
continuously reminded his attorney about the importance of filing a timely federal petition. Id. 
Through his own research, Holland learned that the court denied his state petition. Id. at *9. 
Holland researched the AEDPA statute of limitations on his own and argued with his counsel 
whether his federal petition would be tolled under AEDPA. Id. Holland was able to submit a pro se 
federal habeas petition to attempt to preserve his claims for subsequent habeas review. Id. at *9. The 
Supreme Court recognized that Holland “was right about the law” and his lawyer was “wrong.” Id.; 
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2557–58. After hearing the petition on its merits, the district court found that 
Holland was unconstitutionally denied a right to self-representation during his capital trial and 
granted him a new trial. ACLU Brief at 9–10. 
 91. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 709 (quoting Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–78 (2005)). 
 92. Brief for Respondents at *31, Ryan v. Gonzalez, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013) (No. 10-930), 
2012 WL 3027353 [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief]. 
 93. Size of Death Row by Year, Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyi 
nfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year. 
 94. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 92, at *31. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See O’Meara, supra note 75, at 547. 
 97. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 92, at *31. 
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incompetent petitioners who have little hope of regaining competency may 
provide the state the finality it seeks, but such a policy runs the risk of 
foreclosing a potential avenue for an aggrieved petitioner’s redress through 
the courts—potentially resulting in an unjust death sentence. 
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